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live in housing units they own has 
risen from around 40 percent before 
World War II to close to 70 percent 
today. The financial crisis that 
started in 2008 has prompted the 
government to spend even more on 
preserving homeownership, despite 
the fact that the financial crisis itself 
was led by the meltdown of the U.S. 
housing market. In light of these 
developments, an increasing number 
of academicians and media reporters 
are now questioning the previously 
unquestionable: Has the American 
dream turned into an American 
obsession?1
In this article, we analyze the 
economic benefits and costs associated 
with owning one’s residence. We 
re-examine a variety of rationales 
that have been put forward in support 
of homeownership, namely, housing 
as a means of saving and a means 
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1For media reports, see, among many others, 
“Shelter, or Burden?” (The Economist, April 
16, 2009); “Building Castles of Sand” (The 
Economist, June 18, 2009); National Public Ra-
dio reporter Kai Ryssdal’s interview with 2006 
Nobel Prize winner Edmund Phelps (March 
26, 2009); columnist Robert Samuelson’s “The 
Homeownership Obsession” (Washington Post, 
July 30, 2008); and the 2008 Nobel Prize winner 
Paul Krugman’s column in the New York Times 
(“Home Not-So-Sweet Home,” June 23, 2008).
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omeownership is an integral part of the 
American culture. Over the past 70 years, 
the U.S. government has devoted significant 
public resources to encouraging and 
promoting homeownership. The recent financial crisis 
has prompted the government to spend even more on 
preserving homeownership, despite the fact that the 
financial crisis itself was led by the meltdown of the 
U.S. housing market. Now, an increasing number of 
academicians and media reporters are questioning the 
previously unquestionable: Has the American dream 
turned into an American obsession? In this article, Wenli 
Li and Fang Yang analyze the economic benefits and costs 
associated with owning one’s residence. They re-examine 
a variety of rationales that have been put forward in 
support of homeownership and examine the evidence for 
an economic cost associated with homeownership.
The strength of the nation lies in the 
homes of its people. — Abraham Lincoln 
A nation of homeowners is 
unconquerable. — Franklin D. Roosevelt
Homeownership, like baseball 
and hotdogs, is an integral part of 
the American culture. Over the past 
70 years, the U.S. government has 
devoted significant public resources 
to encouraging and promoting 
homeownership. (See Housing Policies 
That Promote Homeownership for a 
summary of the various programs.) 
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of investment. We argue that both 
rationales are no longer valid. We also 
examine the evidence for an economic 
cost associated with homeownership, 
that is, the reduced mobility rate. 
In a nutshell, while owning one’s 
own residence carries economic 
benefits for many households, it is 
not for everyone, at least not on 
economic grounds. As the quotes 
from Lincoln and Roosevelt suggest, 
not all arguments for supporting 
homeownership are economic in 
nature. We do not explore in detail 
some of the noneconomic arguments 
that have been offered as reasons 
to subsidize homeownership. These 
noneconomic benefits are typically 




The main economic argument for 
homeownership is that it is the most 
important way in which the majority 
of families accumulate wealth, since 
houses give households a means of 
saving as they pay off their mortgages 
and increase their home equity. 
This mechanism effectively forces 
households to save more than they 
otherwise would. While there have 
been some historical merits to this 
argument,2 the changing economic 
environment has rendered it flawed.





served over the 
years to increase 
homeownership 
in the United States. Most of these 
policies work by reducing the cost of 
homeownership or by increasing the 
flow of capital to the housing market.
The oldest and perhaps most 
powerful of these policy tools lies in 
the federal income tax code formed 
in 1913. Homeowners can deduct 
interest on mortgages of up to $1 
million on their taxes; they can also 
deduct local property taxes. Profits 
(capital gains) from house sales are 
also shielded from taxation for up to 
$250,000 ($500,000 for a married 
couple filing jointly) if the owner 
used the property as a primary 
residence for two of the five years 
before the date of sale.
Finally, as Satyajit Chatterjee 
explained in his 1996 Business Review 
article, if we lease our housing unit 
to another household, our rental 
income as a landlord would be taxed. 
However, if we own the house we live 
in, we are effectively paying ourselves 
rent, and the associated rental 
income is not taxed, according to the 
current tax law. In 2008, according 
to the Office of Management and 
Budget, these tax breaks are both 
about $145 billion. Note that this 
calculation does not count the 
possible taxation of rental income in 
an owner-occupied unit. 
The government also funnels 
cheap credit into government 
housing agencies, including the 
Federal Home Loan Banks and 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.a These 
agencies borrow at preferential rates 
and were long perceived as backed 
by the U.S. Treasury. In July 2008, 
right before the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) was formed, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held 
or guaranteed $5.2 trillion worth of 
mortgages, two-fifths of the national 
total.b
The Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) insures 
mortgages for low- and moderate-
income families that require only a 3 
percent down payment. Created by 
the National Housing Act of 1934, 
the FHA insures private mortgage 
lenders against borrower default on 
residential real estate loans. These 
are the borrowers who typically have 
no credit history, a history of credit 
problems, or not enough cash to 
cover the down payment and closing 
costs and who almost certainly 
wouldn’t qualify for a conventional 
home mortgage. The FHA has 
quadrupled its insurance guarantees 
on mortgages in just the last three 
years. Currently, the FHA insures 
$560 billion of mortgages.
a According to its website, the FHFA was “formed by a legislative merger of the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), 
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) government-sponsored 
enterprise mission team. The FHFA regulates Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 12 Federal 
Home Loan Banks.”
  
b                                                                   
2 The study by Donald Haurin, Patric Hender-
shott, and Susan Wachter explores the wealth 
accumulation and housing choices of young 
households and confirms the joint nature 
of the decision of house tenure and wealth 
accumulation. On the one hand, homeown-
ership is an important component of total 
wealth. On the other hand, households need a 
minimum amount of wealth to purchase their 
first house. Other authors, including Louise 
Schneier and Gary Engelhardt, have analyzed 
savings in response to differentiating housing 
prices. Although results in some studies are 
contradictory, in general, young households 
in more expensive areas tend to save more.Why Don’t People Save 
Enough? The idea of using housing 
as a commitment to save rests on the 
observation that people lack self-
control. The typical real-life examples 
of this behavioral problem include 
people postponing their decision to 
go on a diet, to exercise, or to quit 
smoking. In the case of economic 
decisions, numerous surveys have 
found that households often report 
that they ought to be saving at a higher 
rate than they are actually doing 
now. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that households will not achieve their 
desired level of “targeted” saving, 
since short-run preferences for instant 
gratification undermine their efforts to 
implement long-run plans that require 
patience.3
Economists have formalized this 
lack of self-control using the idea of 
hyperbolic discounting. A household 
with hyperbolic preferences would 
say the following:  “Next Christmas, 
I will buy modest gifts and use the 
savings for my retirement. But this 
Christmas, I’ll splurge.” Of course, 
when next Christmas comes around, 
the household splurges again! In effect, 
the household is really two households: 
a patient household when it thinks 
about its long-term preferences and 
an impatient household whenever 
it actually confronts an immediate 
choice.4 These preferences induce what 
economists call a dynamic inconsistency. 
A direct implication of the 
hyperbolic discounting model is 
that households with these types of 
preferences will try to pre-commit 
themselves to a scheme that will be 
costly to break. In our earlier examples, 
that amounts to going on a for-fee diet 
plan, buying a health club membership, 
or buying cigarettes by the pack 
instead of by the carton because 
having a carton of cigarettes at hand 
increases the temptation to smoke 
more, even though buying cigarettes 
by the carton costs less.5 In the case 
of savings decisions, households will 
hold their wealth in an illiquid form, 
such as housing, since such assets are 
costly to liquidate and thus relatively 
better protected from splurges on 
consumption. 
Does Owning a House Help 
Households Save More? The 
effectiveness of using one’s house as a 
means of forced savings has weakened 
substantially in recent years. For the 
majority of households, housing is 
indeed the most important asset in 
their portfolio. With the exception 
of the stock market boom in the late 
1990s, housing as a share of total 
household assets has been trending up 
for the past four decades (Figure 1). 
Unfortunately, households are not 
necessarily accumulating more wealth 
by buying up more housing assets. 
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T
here is no hard and fast distinction between economic 
and social benefits.  In this article, we call the benefits of 
homeownership that accrue to the individual  household 
“economic.”  But  homeowners may also confer benefits 
on their neighbors and communities, or on the nation; we 
term these benefits “social.” The basic argument for the social benefits of 
homeownership is that homeownership improves homeowners’ incentives in 
a number of ways. Because of transaction costs, homeowners are less likely 
to move and hence remain more embedded in their communities for a longer 
time. This may promote civic involvement. Homeowners are also residual 
claimants of their property: When it comes time to sell, they reap the profits 
and suffer the losses. Thus, they tend to maintain their properties and are 
better neighbors than renters. 
According to Edward Coulson’s Business Review, the empirical evidence 
for the social benefits of homeownership includes the following. First, 
owner-occupants maintain their dwellings to a greater extent than renters 
(or landlords) maintain theirs: More money is spent on maintaining owner-
occupied housing than is spent on maintaining rental property; homeowners 
spend more time gardening than renters; and rental property depreciates 
faster than owner-occupied property. Second, homeowners’ children are 
more successful, measured by such factors as lower teenage pregnancy rates 
and higher educational attainment, than kids from non-owner-occupied 
dwellings. Third, homeowners socialize more with their neighbors.*
*  However, in a recent study, Grace Wong Bucchianeri finds little evidence that homeowners 
  are happier by any of the following measures: life satisfaction, overall mood, overall feeling, and 
  general moment-to-moment emotions.
3 Richard Thaler’s article was one of the first 
to point out several “anomalies” in households’ 
saving behavior. 
4 The article by George-Marios Angeletos, 
David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobac-
man, and Stephen Weinberg provides a good 
review of this literature.
5 Not all attempts to pre-commit are successful, 
as Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier 
show in their study of individuals who take out 
expensive long-term gym memberships, but 
seldom go to the gym.Business Review  Q3  2010   23 www.philadelphiafed.org
Thanks to financial developments over 
the past several decades, more and 
more households with limited means 
are able to borrow, and those who 
are borrowing are also increasingly 
borrowing more. During the housing 
boom years, it was not uncommon for 
many households to purchase their 
houses with less than 20 percent down 
or even a zero down payment. For ex-
ample, combo loans have been used to 
reduce the down payment requirement 
while avoiding mortgage insurance. 
The “80-20” combo loan program cor-
responds to the traditional loan-to-val-
ue ratio of 80 percent, using a second 
loan for the 20 percent down payment. 
The “80-15-5” program requires a 5 
percent down payment provided by 
the homebuyer with the remaining 15 
percent coming from a second loan. 
There are many other new mortgage 
products, such as interest-only mort-
gage contracts, that allow households 
to pay only the interest part of the pay-
ment for a number of years. The result 
is that households don’t accumulate 
any home equity during those years. 
Even after households have ac-
cumulated some home equity, because 
of the declining cost of mortgage 
refinancing or home equity lines of 
credit, many households are now so 
easily able to tap their home equity to 
pay pressing bills that they simply do 
not accumulate wealth.6 A popular 
phrase used to describe this phenom-
enon during the housing boom years 
was “treating the house as an ATM.” 
Economists have estimated that house-
holds’ marginal propensity to consume 
out of increased housing wealth ranges 
from 3 to 4 cents on a dollar to over 10 
cents, comparable to or even exceeding 
the marginal propensity to consume 
out of increases in financial wealth.7 In 
other words, for every dollar of house-
price appreciation, homeowners take 
out 3, 4, or even 10 cents of their home 
equity for other consumption purposes, 
such as making home improvements, 
buying new cars or appliances, or even 
taking vacations.8 Owning a house 
is no more a means of forced savings 
than putting money into stock mutual 
funds is. Back in 1997, David Laibson 
pointed out that financial innovation 
may have reduced households’ savings 
rate by providing too much “liquidity,” 
weakening forced savings in previously 
illiquid assets.
Indeed, economic data show that 
the mortgage leverage ratio has been 
consistently rising since the mid 1980s. 
Home equity as a share of households’ 
net worth has not changed much and 
even declined from the mid 1980s to 
the late 1990s and during the current 
crisis (Figure 2). The increase in the 
mortgage leverage ratio — the ratio 
of the amount of the mortgage to the 
value of the house — is prevalent 
among homeowners of all ages.9 The 
cash-out mortgage refinancing rate 
6 We have seen a continued decline in average 
points and fees on conventional loans closed 
— from 2.5 percent of the average loan amount 
in 1983 to around 1 percent at the end of 1995 
and 0.5 percent in 2004. (See Wenli Li’s 2005 
Business Review articles for more details.)
7 See the article by Wenli Li and Rui Yao.
8 In some instances, homeowners use cashed-out 
funds for home improvements, which poten-
tially raise the value of the house and thus can 
be viewed as wealth building. We do not have 
updated statistics on the extent of such activity, 
but early studies by the Federal Reserve Board 
indicate that about 40 percent of homeowners 
who took out cash claimed to have used part of 
their cashed-out funds for home improvements 
during refinancing in 1998 and early 1999.
9 See Wenli Li’s 2005 Business Review article.
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— the share of mortgage refinancings 
(number of loans) in which borrowers 
took out larger loans than they owed 
in relation to total mortgage refinanc-
ings — also trended up from as early as 
1991 until 2006 (Figure 3). 
Second Homes and Investment 
Properties. Not all housing combines 
consumption and investment deci-
sions; vacation homes and investment 
properties have become increasingly 
important. According to Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act data (HMDA), 
after a drop from the early 1990s to 
the late 1990s, the percent of mortgage 
loan applications for non-owner-occu-
pied dwellings started to increase in 
1999 and reached a peak of 13 percent 
in 2006 (Figure 4) that exceeded its 
previous peak in 1993. More recent 
data from LPS Analytics indicate a 
similar pattern. Starting from January 
2005, the share of second homes and 
investment properties in all mortgages 
has been consistently increasing, flat-
tening out in 2007, while the share of 
loans for primary residences has been 
declining (Figure 5).10 In 2009, about 8 
percent of total mortgages in the LPS 
database are for second homes and 
investment properties. The increas-
ing share in investment properties is 
especially noticeable. 
While combining a consumption 
good and an investment good tends 
to increase saving (at some cost, e.g., 
illiquidity, lack of diversification), va-
cation homes, compared with primary 
residences, generate much less con-
sumption value to owners, on average, 
especially for working families.11 In 
most cases, investment properties have 
                                       
FIGURE 2
FIGURE 3
                                      
                                 
10 Notice the discrepancy between the charts 
derived from HMDA data and those derived 
from LPS data. This discrepancy arises because 
the HMDA chart is based on all mortgage 
applications, while the LPS chart is based on 
approved loans.
11 A working individual typically starts with two 
weeks of vacation time annually. 
Data source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds (annual); last point plotted: 2008
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no consumption value to their owners. 
Furthermore, owners often expect 
to flip investment properties fairly 
quickly. This makes the purchase of in-
vestment properties more of a short- to 
medium-term investment strategy, sim-
ilar to buying stocks. Therefore, buying 
second and investment homes is more 
susceptible to fluctuations in income 
and house prices than buying primary 
residences. In other words, owners are 
more likely to be constrained or have 
more incentives to walk away from 
their investment properties in times of 
difficulty, and this further weakens the 
argument that second and investment 
homes force households to save. Not 
surprisingly, during the current crisis, 
the foreclosure rates of investment 
properties have risen at a much faster 
rate than that of loans for primary 
residences. Even for second homes, 
foreclosure rates have also exceeded 
those for primary homes in recent 
months (Figure 6). 
Nonetheless, second homes or 
vacation homes enjoy tax benefits 
similar to those for primary homes, 
provided that households stay in their 
second homes at least 14 days a year or 
that for at least 10 percent of the time 
the property is rented out. Investment 
property owners can deduct their 
operating losses, repair expenses, and 
depreciation from their income taxes. 
Taken together, all of the government 
programs to subsidize housing also 
increase investment in second homes 
and flipping (investment properties).  
HOMEOWNERSHIP AND
INVESTMENT
Another argument for homeown-
ership often heard is that housing is a 
relatively safe asset that pays off in the 
long run. This argument turns out to 
be a myth as well. 
The Returns to Investing in 
Housing. Similar to returns to indi-
vidual stocks, the return and volatility 
                             
              
FIGURE 4
FIGURE 5
                             
                
Data source: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data (annual); last point plotted: 2008
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of investing in housing vary across 
time and depend importantly on mar-
ket conditions in particular locations. 
Over the past three decades, in the 
aggregate, house prices have indeed 
fluctuated much less than the prices 
of stocks. Housing overall has also 
fared better in crises than other assets. 
Even during this crisis, the S&P/Case-
Shiller home price index (Composite 
10)12 adjusted by the consumer price 
index (shelter) indicates that house 
prices as of the second quarter of 2009 
have fallen to only a tad below their 
2004 levels (Figure 7).
 But for most people, the volatil-
ity of their local housing market is 
more relevant than the volatility of 
the national market.  And volatility in 
individual housing markets, like that 
of individual company stocks, can be 
a lot larger. For example, the standard 
deviation of real annual house price 
changes between 1975 and 2008 was 
3.4 for the nation, 1.5 percent or less in 
Cleveland, Indianapolis, and Louis-
ville, but 11.6 percent in Boston, 9.9 
percent in Honolulu, and 9.7 percent 
in San Jose. This high volatility in 
local housing markets implies that, like 
owning individual stocks, households 
can lose big as well as win big when 
buying and selling houses. And the 
opportunities for diversification are 
fewer in housing markets than in stock 
markets.  While someone can buy indi-
vidual stocks or an overall stock index 
such as the S&P 500 market index 
offered by most mutual fund compa-
nies, the market for trading such price 
indexes for housing at the national 
and local level remains very thin. (We 





                                                 
                                           
12 The 10 cities are Boston, Chicago, Denver, 
Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San 
Diego, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. Data source: Federal Housing Finance Agency; S&P; Dow Jones (annual); last point plotted: 2008
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Comparing the rate of return on 
housing with that of other assets such 
as stocks is a tricky business. Ignoring 
leverage and tax concerns, it is not 
obvious that owning housing as an 
asset pays off in the long run. We con-
struct Sharpe ratios for the 10 cities 
included in the Case-Shiller house 
price index and the nation. A Sharpe 
ratio is a measure of an asset’s reward 
per unit of risk and helps us compare 
risk-adjusted returns across assets. We 
find that between 1976 and 2008, of 
the 10 cities, Denver, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, and Las Vegas all have much 
lower Sharpe ratios than the S&P 500 
stock index. In other words, in risk-
adjusted terms, the return to housing 
in these areas is lower than the return 
to holding stocks. The Sharpe ratios 
for Miami and Washington, D.C. are 
also a tad below that of the S&P 500. 
Although the Sharpe ratio for the 
overall house price index is somewhat 
higher, as we argued earlier, it is not 
clear that households have access to 
this market. 
Some Complications in Calcu-
lating the Returns to Housing. Of 
course, this calculation is incomplete 
because leverage can magnify even 
modest returns. Given that houses 
are usually bought with big loans (as 
a matter of fact, a house is the only 
asset a family with limited means 
can buy with a big loan), they can 
bring in returns much higher than 
the house-price appreciation rate. 
Here is an example. Suppose a family 
bought a house for $200,000 with a 
$40,000 down payment (equity). In 
one year, the house’s price appreci-
ated 2 percent. The rate of return for 
the family for that year was actually a 
whopping 10 percent (= ($200,000 * 
2 percent)/$40,000). But leverage also 
increases risk. In that sense, buying 
houses with a large mortgage loan is 
similar to buying stocks on margin. It 
is great in a favorable (bull) market, 
but it works against the owner in an 
unfavorable (bear) market. Let’s say 
that the $200,000 house a family pur-
chased with a $160,000 mortgage falls 
in value to $150,000. The outstanding 
debt of $160,000 exceeds the value of 
the property. Because the family owes 
more than it owns, it has negative net 
worth.  Leverage is therefore a double-
edged sword.
There are also other complications 
in calculating the effective rates of re-
turn on housing because of additional 
costs associated with owning one’s own 
residence and the various govern-
ment subsidies. Homeowners must pay 
taxes on their properties in addition to 
maintenance fees. Effective property 
tax rates range anywhere from 0.17 
percent to 2.77 percent of the house 
value, according to the National Asso-
ciation of Home Builders, and mainte-
nance fees are typically 1 to 2 percent 
of the house value. Mortgage interest 
payments and property taxes, however, 
are deductible from federal income 
taxes. Assuming an annual deprecia-
tion rate of 2.5 percent, a property tax 
rate of 1.5 percent, a mortgage interest 
rate of 7 percent, and a marginal in-
come tax rate of 25 percent for a typi-
cal taxpayer, the adjusted real rate of 
return on housing actually falls below 
zero (1.3-2.5-1.5+0.25(7+1.5))=-0.575 
percent! Remember that 1.3 percent 
is the real rate of return of the na-
tional house-price index between 1975 
and 2009.13 Meantime, under the 25 
percent marginal income tax rate for 
a typical taxpayer, the rate of return 
on stocks during the same period falls 
only to 4.5*(1-0.25)=3.375 percent.
It is worth reiterating that the ef-
fective rate of return we just calculated 
is for an average homeowner. For many 
moderate- to low-income homeowners, 
the effective rate of return from invest-
ing in housing may be smaller. The 
reason is as follows. Lower-income
homeowners benefit less from deduc-
tions of property tax and mortgage 
interest payments because of the pro-
gressive nature of the federal income 
tax and the fact that property tax is 
calculated solely on the value of the 
property. To claim the mortgage inter-
est deduction, taxpayers must itemize 
when filing federal tax returns, rather 
than taking the standard deduction. 
Because of the progressive nature of 
the federal income tax, the value of 
itemized deductions rises as income 
rises. Those facing the highest mar-
ginal tax rates — high-income taxpay-
ers — receive a much more powerful 
tax benefit from tax deductions than 
low-income taxpayers receive. As a 
result, low-income taxpayers are less 
likely to itemize, placing the benefits of 
the home mortgage interest deduction 
out of reach. In addition, high-income 
earners tend to have more valuable 
houses. In general, the greater the 
house value, the greater the interest 
payment on the associated mortgage. 
The table on page 28 illustrates the 
regressive nature of the deduction 
for home mortgage interest. Those in 
lower-income groups claim few deduc-
tions, while those earning over $75,000 
in adjusted gross income claim the vast 
majority. 
Housing as a Hedge Against 
Other Assets. Although investing in 
housing may not be as attractive an 
investment strategy as conventional 
wisdom claims, owning one’s own 
residence can be used as a hedge 
against ownership of other assets. 
Standard portfolio theory predicts 
that owning one’s house, especially 
the build-up of home equity, helps 
diversify risks households face that are 
not positively correlated with house-
13 Note that we didn’t take out the mortgage 
interest from the rate of return on the grounds 
that a stock bought on margin would have 
required paying interest on the borrowed funds 
as well.28   Q3  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
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Under $20,000  4.0% 37.8% $278
$20,000 - $29,999  13.1% 14.1% $910
$30,000 - $39,999  24.2% 10.7% $1,674
$40,000 - $49,999  35.2% 8.0% $2,462
$50,000 - $74,999  50.9% 13.3% $4,068
$75,000 - $99,999  69.0% 7.3% $6,210
$100,000 - $199,999  78.9% 6.8% $8,928
$200,000 and over  75.7% 1.9% $14,374
 Source: Internal Revenue Service, Tax Foundation calculations. 
price movement. For instance, between 
January 1998 and December 2007, the 
correlation coefficients of the S&P/ 
Case-Shiller house price index with 
the Lehman aggregate bond index 
and the S&P 500 stock index are, 
respectively, -0.056, and -0.086. This 
means that when financial assets fall in 
value, house prices typically rise, and 
vice versa.  Thus, housing potentially 
can be used to hedge against shocks 
to investment in stocks, at least during 
the period in question.14
One question naturally arises: 
Is owning one’s residence the most 
efficient way to make a portfolio 
investment in housing? Remember, 
owning a home subjects a household’s 
wealth to shocks to local housing 
markets, which are much more volatile 
than the housing market as a whole.  
In principle and ideally, one should be 
able to take advantage of movements 
in house prices without having to own 
one’s residence. Furthermore, one 
should even be able to hedge against 
house-price movements in the local 
market by owning shares of other 
housing markets. While such markets 
exist, they are as yet not feasible for 
most households.  
Housing derivatives first appeared 
in 2006 as futures contracts (S&P/
Case-Shiller house-price index 
futures and options) on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. However, in 
the euphoria of the housing boom of 
the past decade, they attracted little 
attention from builders and developers. 
Investors prefer to make bearish bets 
via more customized instruments.  
In June 2009, Karl Case and Robert 
Shiller, the namesakes of the Case-
Shiller house-price index, launched 
a product called MacroShares to 
open up the market in order to retain 
investors. MacroShares are securities 
that reflect the value of the S&P/Case-
Shiller house-price indexes in 10 large 
urban centers. The securities are issued 
in pairs: one for investors who wish to 
bet on the upward movement of house 
prices, and one for those who think 
14 Given the low correlation coefficients, we do 
not wish to emphasize the potential benefits 
of homeownership as a hedging instrument, 
especially since only 40 percent of households 
participate in the stock market, while nearly 
two-thirds of Americans own their primary 
residences.Business Review  Q3  2010   29 www.philadelphiafed.org
prices will fall. Unlike actual houses, 
MacroShares are traded on public 
exchanges and are therefore liquid. 
Trading in MacroShares has been 
light so far, but there are hopes that 
investors will participate in this market 




Owning one’s home may also have 
important implications for households’ 
mobility. A mobile society is important 
for an efficient labor market. If house-
holds cannot move to gain access to 
better jobs in alternative labor markets, 
the quality of the match in the labor 
market will suffer. People will be stuck 
in jobs they hate and for which they 
are not suited, and employers will have 
less-productive employees. Further-
more, when local economies decline, 
unemployed homeowners may find it 
difficult to search for new jobs.  Ten 
years ago, British economist Andrew 
Oswald argued that homeowner-
ship was positively correlated with 
unemployment: that is, the higher a 
country's rate of homeownership, the 
higher its long-term unemployment 
rate. This claim is still controversial, 
but economists have begun to explore 
the connections between mobility and 
homeownership more rigorously.
Homeowners may be reluctant 
to move for several reasons. First, in 
addition to a range of social concerns 
such as schools, friends, and families, 
homeowners may be reluctant to move 
because of the added financial burden. 
Selling and buying a house incurs 
substantial transaction costs (typically 
6 to 8 percent of the house value). 
Having negative home equity also re-
quires households to put up additional 
cash beyond standard closing costs to 
be able to move. Of course, households 
can also walk away from their houses 
by defaulting or filing for bankruptcy.16 
But such actions have a derogatory 
impact on their ability to borrow in the 
future. 
Second, even when households are 
not financially constrained and have 
the funds to sell the house and move, 
they may still be reluctant to move if 
doing so means selling their house at 
a loss. Economists have termed this 
reluctance “an aversion to loss.” Using 
data from downtown Boston in the 
1990s, David Genesove and Chris 
Mayer find that condominium owners 
are averse to realizing losses. Those 
owners that have higher loan-to-value 
ratios (and, thus, are more likely to 
experience a nominal loss and have 
to pay the bank) tended to set higher 
asking prices and were much less likely 
to sell than other sellers, after control-
ling for other observables, including 
owner type (resident owner or inves-
tor), estimated price index at the time 
of entry, estimated value at last sale, 
and so forth.17 
The United States is generally a 
mobile society. Around 12 percent of 
American homeowners typically move 
in any two-year period, yet families 
with negative equity are around half as 
likely to relocate. Those facing higher 
mortgage rates are 25 percent less 
likely to move, according to a recent 
study by Fernando Ferreira, Joseph 
Gyourko, and Joseph Tracy that used 
data from the American Housing 
Survey from 1985 to 2005. 
Lower mobility by definition can 
be observed only over time, so it will 
take a few years to know how the 
impact of negative equity will play out 
in this cycle. 
.
CONCLUSION
Our review of the economic 
benefits and costs of homeownership 
suggests that the economic case for 
subsidizing homeownership has, at the 
minimum, been oversold.  And we 
have not addressed the offsetting costs. 
Indeed, economists have found that 
government subsidies incur a cost to 
the general economy. For example, in 
his article, Martin Gervais studied the 
welfare consequences of the preferen-
tial tax treatment of housing capital 
and found that the current tax struc-
ture crowds out business capital and 
leads to a loss in consumption of over 
1 percent. Separately, Karsten Jeske 
and Dirk Krueger have studied the role 
of implicit guarantees for government-
sponsored enterprises and found that 
they reduce aggregate welfare, as 
measured by changes in consumption, 
by 0.32 percent.
The net dollar value of own-
ing one’s home remains a question 
for economists and policymakers to 
consider. One thing that is certain is 
that homeownership is not for every-
one, and thus, based on the economic 
benefits, the case for trying to achieve 
a nation of homeowners needs to be 
rethought.  B R  
15 Another potential way to diversify housing 
risk is through the purchase of securitized real 
estate, or equity real estate investment trusts 
(EREITs). However, EREITs, especially those on 
residential housing, remain a very small share of 
the aggregate real estate investment available. 
As pointed out in Elul (2008), the most 
important limit on hedging housing price risk 
through the use of an aggregate index is that 
the majority of movements in individual house 
prices are due to idiosyncratic factors, rather 
than resulting from aggregate volatility.
16 See Wenli Li’s 2009 Business Review article.
17 Despite all the controls, it is still highly likely 
that leverage ratios proxy for other important 
household financial characteristics such as 
income and liquid wealth. Thus, readers should 
take this argument with a grain of salt.REFERENCES
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